Returns to Specialization, Transaction Costs, and the Dynamics of Industry Evolution

When more than one component or activity is needed to produce the final product, a firm may use proprietary standards or adopt a common standard to integrate these components. We call these closed and open firms respectively, and develop a model of industry evolution to study the process by which type of firm comes to dominate the industry. Our simulations show that an industry may diverge from its long run equilibrium configuration for sustained periods of time. Typically, the industry is dominated by closed firms in the early history and by open firms later on. Entry and exit dynamics create transient biases in favor of open firms. First, a closed entrant can capture multiple profits whereas an open entrant faces a lower entry barrier. However, while the odds of closed entry (relative to open entry) are initially greater than one, they decrease with price and eventually open entry becomes more likely than closed entry. Second, though initially closed firms can offset losses in one component with profits from another and thereby have better survival as compared to open firms, when prices fall below a threshold level, a closed firm is more likely to exit than a comparable pair of open firms. Finally, entry by an open firm improves the relative odds of entry by a complementary open firm, especially when the two complementary sectors differ in size or efficiency.Vertical Integration, Externalities, Positive Feedback, Industry Evolution, Transaction Costs, Simulation Models

Quality Certification and the Economics of Contract Software Development A Study of the Indian Software Industry

A significant amount of software development is being outsourced to countries such as India. Many Indian software firms have applied for and received quality certifications like the ISO9001, and the number of quality certified software firms has steadily increased. Despite its growing popularity among Indian software developers, there is very little systematic evidence on the relationship of ISO certification to organizational performance. Using data on 95 Indian software firms and their US clients, we develop a stylized model of a firm that develops software for others to articulate the different ways in which ISO certification can affect firm profits. We conclude that ISO certification enhances firm growth. The results provide partial support for the proposition that ISO certification also enhances revenue for a given size, suggesting that firms are receiving a higher price per unit of output. In turn, this is consistent with the notion that ISO certification also enhances the quality of output. Our field studies confirm that although most firms see ISO certification as a marketing ploy, some of them do proceed to institute more systematic and better-defined processes for software development.

Wholly owned subsidiary versus technology licensing in the worldwide chemical industry.

This paper empirically analyzes the determinants of the choice between wholly owned subsidiary and technology licensing as a strategy for expansion abroad. We use a new and comprehensive database on worldwide plant level investments in the chemical industry during the 1981-1991 period. We find that both cultural distance and the presence of other potential licensors favor the use of licensing as a strategy for expanding abroad, whereas, prior experience favors the choice of wholly owned subsidiary. An implication of this study is that competition in the market for technology can foster the international diffusion of technology through the use of arm's length agreements.Strategic planning; Licensing; Globalization; Foreign investment; Chemical industry;

Pricing Diagnostic Information.

Diagnostic information allows an agent to predict the state of nature about the success of an investment project better than the prior. We analyze the optimal pricing scheme for selling diagnostic information to buyers with different, privately known, ex ante success probability. Investment costs and returns of successful projects are assumed to be the same for all buyers. The value of diagnostic information is the difference in expected payoffs with and without it, and we show that the willingness to pay for diagnostic information is nonmonotonic in the ex ante success probability. When the information seller can offer only one quality level, and negative payments are not allowed, we find that the optimal menu of (linear) contracts is remarkably simple. A pure royalty is offered to buyers with low ex ante success probability, and a pure fixed fee is offered to buyers with high ex ante success probability.Pricing; Diagnostic information; Marketing research;

Markets for technology (why do we see them, why don't we see more of them and why we should care)

This essay explores the nature, the functioning, and the economic and policy implications of markets for technology. Today, the outsourcing of research and development activities is more common than in the past, and specialized technology suppliers have emerged in many industries. In a sense, the Schumpeterian vision of integrating R&D with manufacturing and distribution is being confronted by the older Smithian vision of division of labor. The existence and efficacy of markets for technology can profoundly influence the creation and diffusion of new knowledge, and hence, economic growth of countries and the competitive position of companies. The economic and managerial literatures have touched upon some aspects of the nature of these markets. However, a thorough understanding of how markets for technology work is still lacking. In this essay we address two main questions. First, what are the factors that enable a market for technology to exist and function effectively? Specifically we look at the role of industry structure, the nature of knowledge, and intellectual property rights and related institutions. Second, we ask what the implications of such markets are for the boundaries of the firm, the specialization and division of labor in the economy, industry structure, and economic growth. We build on this discussion to develop the implications of our work for public policy and corporate strategy

Markets for Technology and Their Implications for Corporate Strategy.

Although market transactions for technologies, ideas, knowledge or information are limited by several well-known imperfections, there is evidence that they have become more common than in the past. In this paper we analyze how the presence of markets for technology conditions the technology and corporate strategy of firms. The first and most obvious implication is that markets for technology increase the strategy space: firms can choose to license in the technology instead of developing it in-house or they can choose to license out their technology instead of (or in addition to) investing in the downstream assets needed to manufacture and commercialize the goods. The implications for management include more proactive management of intellectual property, greater attention to external monitoring of technologies, and organizational changes to support technology licensing, joint-ventures and acquisition of external technology. For entrepreneurial startups, markets for technology make a focused business model more attractive. At the industry level, markets for technology may lower barriers to entry and increase competition, with important implications for the firms' broader strategy as well.

Specialized technology suppliers, international spillovers and investment: evidence from the chemical industry.

In this paper we study how the development of specialized upstream technology suppliers in leading countries improves technology access and lowers investment costs for downstream firms in follower countries. We test this idea using a novel database covering all investments in chemical plants in less developed countries ŽLDCs. during the 1980s. We find that investments in chemical plants in the LDCs are greater, the greater is the number of technology suppliers that operate in the first world. A major contribution of this paper is to identify an important but understudied mechanism through which technology is made available.Market for technology; Specialization; Technology supply; Investment; Chemical industry;

Markets for technology in the knowledge economy.

The focus of this research has been the study of the nature and functioning of markets for technologyStrategic planning; Technological planning; Organizational change; Research & development;

Reputation and Competence in Publicly Funded Science: Estimating the Effects on Research Group Productivity..

This paper estimates the "production function" for scientific research publications in the field of biotechnology. It utilizes an exceptionally rich and comprehensive data set pertaining to the universe of research groups that applied to a 1989-1993 research program in biotechnology and bio-instrumentation, sponsored by the Italian National research Council, CNR. A structural model of the resource allocation process in scientific research guides the selection of instruments in the econometric analysis, and controls for selectivity bias effects on estimates based on the performance of funded research units. The average elasticity of research output with respect to the research budget is estimated to be 0.6; but, for a small fraction of groups led by highly prestigious PIs this elasticity approaches 1. These estimates imply, conditional on the distribution of observed productivity, that a more unequal distribution of research funds would increase research output in the short-run. Past research publication performance is found to have an important effect on expect levels of grant funding, and hence on the unit's current productivity in terms of (quality adjusted) publications. The results show that the productivity of aggregate resource expenditures supporting scientific research is critically dependent on the institutional mechanisms and criteria employed in the allocation of such resources.